Friday, January 30, 2015

H. P. Lovecraft: A Nighted World As Mad As I

© Edward Moore 2015

patristics@gmail.com

The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents.

~ Lovecraft, "The Call of Cthulhu"

Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.

~ Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 4.003

The study of philosophy offers many gifts, not least the ability to wax abstruse on any given topic. Exotic jargon that often sounds like (and usually is) a foreign language, and is sometimes poetical -- in a Dada-Surrealist fashion -- enables the philosophical adept to raise even the most mundane topic to the sublunar sphere, where misty daimons dwell, if not to the Ogdoad itself. At its best, philosophy offers a virtually inexhaustible mine of highly elastic tropes, which the creative thinker may use for the sake of elucidating difficult topics, or to make boring ones seem worthy of intellectual engagement. In rare instances, philosophy, or philosophical tropes, may be used to demonstrate the artistic depth of a writer working in a genre traditionally considered "low brow" or at least not up to the standard of literature (whatever that means in our age of thumb-tapping textese productions). Traditionally, horror, science fiction, and fantasy (with rare exceptions) have been ignored by academic critics and theorists, while tales of individual men and women and their often petty trials and tribulations -- works presenting the private troubles of mediocre individuals with all the gravity of world-historical significance -- are still being produced, read, and discussed. The reading of such works does not -- is not meant to -- produce disorientation or the sense of another world pressing upon the consciousness of the reader, demanding comprehension and the bestowal of meaning. Such an experience would require critical engagement with the work resulting in an interpretation (not mere commentary or "book chat," as Gore Vidal was fond of calling the superficial jawing about boilerplated volumes by M.F.A.s at cocktail parties) producing a communicable meaning that goes beyond the familiar, the accepted, the comfortable. Of course, the would-be critical reader requires works that produce that disorientation, make that demand for engagement.

Back when the French "New Novel" was new, Nathalie Sarraute, in the seminal texts Tropisms and The Age of Suspicion (English translations 1964) called for a compositional technique that would "[plunge] the reader into the stream of those subterranean dreams of which Proust only had time to obtain a rapid aerial view ... [and] would give the reader the illusion of repeating these actions himself, in a more clearly aware, more orderly, distinct and forceful manner than he can do in life." H. P. Lovecraft (1890-1937) went beyond any previous writer in his genre, except perhaps Poe, in achieving the type of technique described by Sarraute. (Of contemporary writers of weird fiction, only Thomas Ligotti has succeeded in enveloping us in his soft, dark, decaying, insane universe.) Talented writers of weird fiction (or "dark fantasy," as I have seen a recent volume of Lovecraft's tales labeled) compose works that lead our consciousness away from the familiar, the mundane, and place upon us the burden of meaning; of not being shown or told, but being involved in the unfolding of an idea generated by the author for the sake of those who come after: the craftsmanly readers who will work up the idea into a discursive structure extending beyond the author into the realm of perpetual creativity. Works by such authors, as Sarraute puts it, "break away from all that is prescribed, conventional and dead, to turn towards what is free, sincere and alive, [and] will necessarily, sooner or later, become ferments of emancipation and progress." The responsive reader of such works is caught up in the act of creation, of experiencing meaning privately, and then expressing this meaning publicly, through discourse -- that is, criticism and interpretation.

Theory is of little help in this endeavor (unless we approach theory as just another form of creative writing or, at its best -- as in certains works by Derrida, for example -- literature), for meaning is not discovered but bestowed; analysis of a linguistic structure will not reveal meaning, it will only display the operation of linguistic signifiers. It is only through intellectual engagement with a work of art that meaning is bestowed; and this is accomplished by the reader when he chooses the themes that inspire him emotionally and motivate him intellectually, and then give voice to the experience. According to Wittgenstein, certain inspirational or motivational themes cannot be expressed logically -- such as ethics, religion, and metaphysics -- and are therefore uncommunicable and hence "nonsensical." But these supposedly unsayable and silly things are precisely the potent themes of literature: themes that draw the reader forth, into the realm of communication and creativity, and demand what Emerson called the "power to connect ... thought with its proper symbol [and] to communicate it without loss" (Nature, chapter IV). If philosophy in our time has "suppressed its own creativity," as Lavine once remarked, and is now overly technical and largely irrelevant, disconnected from the transcendent, or at least escapist, yearnings of humankind, I believe philosophy -- or philosophical tropes -- can still be used creatively for the elucidation of literary art -- for the extension of that art into the realm of perpetual discourse (the "ongoing conversation of Western Civilization," in Rorty's memorable words) where it belongs. Art for art's sake; philosophy for art's sake.

One of my favorite tropes is found in Plato's so-called Unwritten Doctrines (teachings that he communicated in private lectures to his best students, and which were recorded only by his successors in the Academy) -- the metaphysical schema of the One and the Indefinite Dyad, and the active creative force called the Demiurge (craftsman) or World-Soul. I spent some of the best years of my life studying and interpreting the various forms of Platonic philosophy (no pun intended) from the early Academy to the Neoplatonic schools of both pagans and Christians. While the discipline of this specialization kept my mind sharp, despite my devotion to the rites of Bacchus, the only intellectual benefit I received from this recondite occupation was a fund of tropes that continue to ring in my mind like silver coins (as someone said of the poetical lines of T. S. Eliot). So I shall put some of them to use, as I discuss here one of my favorite writers of fiction, H. P. Lovecraft. Here I am, about ten years ago, giving an academic account of Plato's metaphysics, in an article on "Middle Platonism" that I wrote for the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (www.iep.utm.edu/midplato/):

Drawing upon Pythagorean mathematical theory, Plato began his metaphysical schema with a pair of opposed first principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad. The One is the active principle which imposes limit on the indefinite or unlimited Dyad, thereby laying the ground for the orderly construction of the cosmos. Through this influence of the One upon the Dyad numbers are generated, that is, the Decad, which in turn generates all other numbers. The most important of these primordial numbers is the tetraktys, numbers one through four, the sum total of which is ten, the Decad. The tetraktys also was interpreted by Plato as generating the four mathematical dimensions, with the number one corresponding to the point, two to the line, three to the plane, and four to the solid. Between the Ideal-Numbers or Decad Plato places the World-Soul, corresponding roughly to the Demiurge of the Timaeus. The World-Soul mediates between the Ideal realm and matter, projecting the four dimensions on base matter in order to form the four elements, Fire, Air, Water, and Earth.

The Indefinite Dyad -- to get right to the trope -- is the unruly or partially formed idea that the author, or One, must bring under some type of control, for the sake of communication. The idea, once articulated through careful consideration and revision, shows itself to be not a monumental concept, but a discursive structure, quite like Plato's mathematical -- or, more precisely, geometrical -- dimensions. This structure, despite the efforts of the author, is -- due to intrusions of intertextuality and the anxiety of influence -- constantly shifting in a maddeningly elusive fashion, as related ideas and notions are brought in for clarification or accentuation; sometimes adopted, sometimes rejected; at other times (and this most interestingly) faced up to and "exorcised" in an agon with a highly influential predecessor, for the sake of the author's originality and continued development (a process that Harold Bloom has mapped out so well). If the author stays the course, and does not get frustrated, he or she will produce a unified text that is readable and interpretable, and does not wander lamely in a solipsistic sphere of endless self-referentiality; but this requires the author to acknowledge -- even agonistically -- his influential predecessors and to relinquish some meaning-generating control to the reader (the Demiurge or World-Soul).

A Platonist (or Neoplatonist) of the third century C.E., Plotinus, considered the One (author), however, to be quite the solipsist. Alone with itself, the One "overflowed" its overabundant power, and the Intellect (a sort of mediator between the mad genius of the One and its sober interpreter, the World-Soul) set about arranging the primal cosmic ideas into some type of orderly whole. Here is Yours Truly in academic mode again, in another article, on "Neoplatonism," for the same publication (www.iep.utm.edu/neoplato/):

Plotinus declares that the One is 'alone with itself' and ineffable (cf. Enneads VI.9.6 and V.2.1). The One does not act to produce a cosmos or a spiritual order, but simply generates from itself, effortlessly, a power (dunamis) which is at once the Intellect (nous) and the object of contemplation (theôria) of this Intellect. While Plotinus suggests that the One subsists by thinking itself as itself, the Intellect subsists through thinking itself as other, and therefore becomes divided within itself: this act of division within the Intellect is the production of Being, which is the very principle of expression or discursivity (Ennead V.1.7).

It is at the level of Being -- that is, the state of existence in which each existent is fully engaged in contemplating reality and acting in accordance with its predetermined end or telos -- that the World-Soul or Demiurge (or reader, to maintain the trope) goes beyond simple contemplation and enters upon the more arduous and personal task of creating. The Intellect, in Plotinus' schema, is rather like an editor, arranging material to achieve the greatest clarity possible; this involves, as Plotinus writes, thinking as an other -- that is, the author. Every fully engaged reader is both editor and critic / interpreter. In order to bestow meaning upon a literary work, we choose the themes -- expressed through dialogue, action, and occasionally direct commentary from the narrator -- that resonate most powerfully with us; and by contemplating the embedded metaphors, metonymic or synecdochal entwinings, and lurking whispering symbols, we arrive at a personal meaning, or set of meanings, which, when communicated effectively, becomes an authoritative reading -- a work of literature in its own right.

The idea that literary criticism is itself a form of literature was put forth by Geoffrey Hartman, in his quite literary scholarly study, Criticism in the Wilderness (1980), which had an immense influence upon me as an undergraduate majoring in Comparative Literature. It is now commonplace to consider every act of reading as a creative act. When one critically interprets a text, one is not only clarifying whatever meaning one has found there; one is also extending the boundaries of that text to include other related ideas and concepts -- including one's own moral, ethical, and aesthetic judgments -- and thereby producing a new text that is a work of literary art in its own right. Meaning, here, is not discovered through a careful reading of the text; rather, it is bestowed upon the text by the creative reader / critic / interpreter. The classic, or Classical, notion of interpretation, in Aristotle's sense of tekhnê hermêneutikê ("art of interpretation") does not reveal the meaning of ideas or events, but provides an understanding of how these ideas or events are formed and come to appear before us. This notion of interpretation is not creative or artistic, but scientific; and art, especially literature, is not science: a lesson we should have learned long ago when the New Critics -- "fundamentally mechanics," as Gore Vidal labeled them -- attempted to separate the author from the text, "solemnly playing with what has been invented by others for use, not analysis" (Vidal, "Novelists and Critics of the 1940s." 1953) -- in short, these "critics" reduced the text to a scientifically observable object, not a vital expression of a creative mind. As Paul Ricoeur explained, in The Conflict of Interpretations (1974), interpretation (hermeneutics) is a set of discursive statements leading to a grasp of the real through meaningful expression, not a description of impressions coming from the things themselves. Description is the task of philosophers and scientists; literary artistists -- including critic-interpreters -- engage in truth-saying, they express meaning.

We are becoming aware now, with the advent of the "digital humanities," that a scientific approach to literature can only reveal historical trends, statistics, not insight into the meaning of texts, which is always personal -- and personally creative, or demiurgic. For those with a certain critical mindset (I am being kind) in which texts are viewed as artifacts to be studied instead of works to be contemplated -- while the persons who produced these texts are relegated to the status of cultural scribes instead of prophets of their own unique vision -- the impersonal or even anti-personalistic program of "computational criticism" or the "digital humanities" will have great appeal. Indeed, in our technocratic age, where reading and writing is largely confined to text messages and "tweets," any "discipline" in which a computer -- not a thinking, feeling, desiring person -- does the "thinking" is guaranteed a wild success. In the March 2014 issue of The New Yorker, Joshua Rothman dealt critically with the guru of this new zombifying fad (at least I hope it's a fad), Professor Franco Moretti of Stanford University, who has written two predictably successful books on the subject. Rothman summarizes Moretti's "critical" attitude:

Viewed from Moretti’s statistical mountaintop, traditional literary criticism, with its idiosyncratic, personal focus on individual works, can seem self-indulgent, even frivolous. What’s the point, his graphs seem to ask, of continuing to interpret individual books -- especially books that have already been interpreted over and over? Interpreters, Moretti writes, 'have already said what they had to.' Better to focus on 'the laws of literary history' -- on explanation, rather than interpretation.

I have never read, nor have I ever produced, an interpretation of a text that was not also an explanation (apparently, artificial distinctions are not the sole property of philosophers). But of course, laws are for scientists (not for artists or politicians or police officers), and Moretti is, perhaps, a frustrated or failed scientist who disregards the humanistic tradition of private interpretation offered up for public edification in favor of a cool analytical approach that has little or nothing to do with art. The act of personal creation that is private interpretation or criticism of a text may, of course, at times be "idiosyncratic" (but that implies that there are interpretations that are idiomatic), self-indulgent, or even downright solipsistic. When, however, the interpretation or criticism -- however odd, puzzling or Unheimlich it may be -- is written down, it extends the discursive structure initiated by the authorial One, who is "beyond being," into the realm of active engagement, or "becoming," where meaning, in all its equivocal force, passes from contemplation to action -- from private thoughts to public utterance. This is a great, an invaluable aid to the author, who will gain an understanding of him or herself not in private, introspective moments, as a solitary mind, but as an agent of meaning in a world where some people, at least, seek an ever more intimate intellectual and emotional connection with their fellows. This is one of the functions art, after all, especially literature.

Gertrude Stein, in her essay "What are Master-pieces and Why Are There So Few of Them" (1935) put it quite well, in her eccentric manner:

When you are writing before there is an audience anything written is as important as any other thing and you cherish anything and everything that you have written. After the audience begins, naturally they create something that is they create you, and so not everything is so important, something is more important than another thing ...

When one hearkens to the voice of one's readers, one will become aware of the accretions that have obscured one's true form, like the sea-god Glaukos in Plato's Republic. Interpretation and / or criticism often serves the purpose of clearing away those parts of a writer's work that simply do not yield a clear conception. Many times a writer will consider the unguarded, or what T. S. Eliot called the "unconscious," moments of his text as those that are the most personal, and hence, the most valuable. To create an authentic work of art, one that inspires the various dêmiourgoi to extend the discourse, the author must not impose his private existence -- rendered in partially legible symbols -- upon the craftsmanly readers; he or she must, rather, deliberately compose a text that demonstrates a comprehension of the events being recounted, and not merely provide a description of the emotions produced by the events. "Poetry," as Eliot wrote (and I take poetry here to include all literature), "is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality." The personality he is referring to is not, of course, what I would call the authentic self, or the 'I', but the un- or partially processed (I hate that metaphor but I'll use it anyway) emotions that we readily take to be indicative of our true self merely because they are immediate, or more precisely, unmediated by that pesky intellect that so many contemporary denizens of this globe strive so assiduously to avoid. This is not to say that literature should not deal with emotions and personality; it means only that the unprocessed (there it is again, damnit) buffetings of a private psyche should be articulated in a polished style that invites response and communication. If this involves a temporary escape from one's personality for the sake of a humanistic art, so be it. "But, of course, only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things" (T. S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent." 1919). I have always loved that rather acerbic aside.

Reasons for desiring escape are as numerous as the persons who have them. In many "semi-autobiographical" novels (a label usually indicating that the writer has written a desired meaning into his life) we as readers are asked to empathize with a character that is being shown to us for one purpose only: to edify the writer. An appeal to our escapist and voyeuristic tendencies is what causes the pages to get turned; Schadenfreude is the usual 'moral' response to those bildungsroman in which the subject-author is finally thwarted, and left to a life he never intended, or worse. In the best of these "coming of age" novels, for example Somerset Maugham's Of Human Bondage, and Arthur Machen's The Hill of Dreams, the moral temperament of the reader will lead him to decide whether a victory -- or at least a desired end -- was achieved at the end of the narrative. Maugham's novel has the semi-autobiographical Philip Carey proposing marriage, successfully, to a young lady he barely knows, except for a romp in the bushes at a hop field. That he proposes in an art museum is rather aesthetically pleasing and, of course, symbolic (Philip is a failed artist). (Never mind that Philip thought his lady to be pregnant; he desired both marriage and a life of adventure, and chose the latter.) Unless one shares with Philip the wanderlust that made him desire a life of world travel and exotic adventure (which marriage forced him to abandon), his winning the hand of a beautiful young lady is not exactly a tragic end. In both of these works we are asked to care about the details of rather inconsequential lives; especially in Lucian's case: the manuscripts left behind by the poor guy weren't even legible, making even posthumous recognition an impossibility. The reader will feel pity here, if he or she is but a tad sensitive. However, in Machen's tale, Lucian the failed lover and writer is shown to be a deliriously devoted and sincere lover; he is obsessed with one young lady, whom he fails to win because of his morbid attachment to a dreamscape that is ever before his eyes. His belief in the sanctifying power of beauty (or Beauty) is deeply moving. Life in the stark gray world, however, holds no place for Lucian, and he dies from an overdose of laudanum, a sacrifice to his art. This, to me, is authentic tragedy (a term, like "hero," that is so often over- and mis-used in our day as to be virtually meaningless). And we all know, along with Aristotle, that tragedy is the most satisfying of all literary escapes from our tedious narcoleptic reality. Catharsis and all that.

In the works of H. P. Lovecraft, we find only one novella, The Case of Charles Dexter Ward, containing a minor autobiographical touch. The general personality, or rather characteristics, of the eponymous main character likely resembles Lovecraft, as he saw himself as a youth: a pallid young scholar, shy and reclusive, yet not easily given to embarrassment or lack of confidence in his mental powers, with an almost morbid attachment to things of the past. But that is a description of a character type not a personality, and in a work of literary art such description serves only to provide occasion and motive for the action of the narrative. The autobiographical reminiscences are confined largely to external details: recollection of his first youthful impressions of his beloved hometown of Providence, Rhode Island, and the powerful aesthetic sway it held over him; his antiquarian rambles about Stampers Hill and surrounding environs; and, of course, his redemptive return to his native ground -- and all the dreams and inspiration it harbored for him -- after his ill-starred marriage and soul-sapping two-year exile in New York City (symbolized in the story by Charles's visit to an incredibly aged necromancer in Transylvania, where Charles is initiated into dark secrets of an ancient and terrible sorcery). But the psychological import of these experiences is never explored -- indeed, how could it be; he was composing a work of "weird fiction" or "dark fantasy" (I rather prefer the latter appellation) and such a genre will only get bogged down in the sucking mud of the common day if inner experience is given too much ink. And besides, Lovecraft himself confessed to an indifference regarding human aspirations and, indeed, to the ultimate fate of our race. In a letter written in 1929, when he was approaching his fortieth year, Lovecraft wrote that the universe does not "[give] a damn one way or another about the especial wants and ultimate welfare of mosquitoes, rats, lice, dogs, men, pterodactyls, trees, fungi, dodos, or other forms of biological energy." Yet we know that he read deeply in history, science, some philosophy, and of course his beloved dark fiction, especially Poe, Lord Dunsany, Machen, and R. W. Chambers. He also traveled a bit later in life, visiting historical towns in New England and elsewhere in the States (he never went to Europe, though he did visit Quebec) that served as inspiration for many of his tales. The few friendships he maintained were mostly carried on through letters, of which he wrote volumes. At the end of the day, Lovecraft was only happy when he was alone with his fantastic thoughts. He even went so far, when he lived in New York City, to keep the lights in his apartment turned off while he read in the closet by the light of a candle, to avoid any knocks at the door. His belief in the pointlessness of human life was not a decadent affectation, it was certainly sincere. He did, however, care about advances in science and psychology, but mostly to the extent that they served as fodder for his fiction, or bolstered his own belief in the ultimate vanity of existence.

* * * * *

In his tales, mostly short stories, Lovecraft followed Poe's dictum that a story writer must strive for a single powerful effect. Poe had no patience for long, rambling, "human interest" stories; he felt that a story or poem that could not be read in a single sitting was likely to fail in its intended effect. Notoriously, Poe even went so far as to state that Paradise Lost is uneven in its effects, and reads less like a single poem and more like a collection of short powerful poems connected by less interesting material. Like Poe, Lovecraft did not attempt to make statements, in his fictional writings, about his contemporary world -- for the understandable reason that everyday life and people simply did not interest him. In an essay written early in his career, when he was thirty-one (1921), Lovecraft distanced himself from the literary naturalism of his time:

I could not write about 'ordinary people' because I am not in the least interested in them. Without interest there can be no art. Man's relations to man do not captivate my fancy. It is man's relation to the cosmos -- to the unknown -- which alone arouses in me the spark of creative imagination. The humanocentric [sic] pose is impossible to me, for I cannot acquire the primitive myopia which magnifies the earth and ignores the background.

So Lovecraft's "pose" became that of a mental voyager in the "infinite immensity of space" that so frightened Pascal; a chronicler of fantasy, dreams (especially nightmare), and the strange and malign superstitions that perhaps still linger in the darkest corners of our world. The person is a small and inconsequential thing in the "vast cosmos-at-large." Those misty daimons that trouble people in the course of their mundane existence, and cause them to ask unanswerable questions about the purpose of life; fate and predestination; the efficacy of religious faith; the progress of history; and the redemptive power of art, are of little interest to Lovecraft. Rather, the blind forces of a cosmos that knows nothing of us and therefore cares nothing for us, and yet "may impose monstrous and unguessable horrors upon certain venturesome members of [the human race]," is Lovecraft's concern -- and paradoxically the locus of his escape from an intolerable existence. As One-author, Lovecraft remained alone with his thoughts (indeed, he was a recluse for most of his life) as he read widely and pondered deeply, always finding more material -- not to gather up into a scholarly work [his impressive and still useful scholarly essay Supernatural Horror in Literature is the one exception] or a realist novel, but to transform through the power of his imagination into an ever-growing discursive structure with a dark, unstable, and infinitely loathsome cosmos as its foundation.

Where does this leave his readers? Are we his creative partners, dêmiourgoi, in communicating the ineffable, as he might say? One of the reasons for reading horror, or "dark fantasy," is to gain escape from ordinary life through the thrill of fear -- from the safety of one's sitting room. This is voyeuristic and cathartic and ultimately aesthetic. But it fades, and leaves behind only emotional impressions, if even that. What raises Lovecraft's work above run-of-the-mill hack writers, and even to the level of Literature (a selection of his tales have been enshrined in a Modern Library edition, and now an annotated scholarly edition of his Complete Works is available), is the philosophical stance he takes in the best of his stories. The stance is never obtrusive, but serves to provide the reader with something intellectual to carry away, something more than just "chills and thrills." If the philosophy expressed is less than edifying, that is because the world as seen by Lovecraft offered nothing to cling to for emotional and intellectual gratification, much less growth. And so Lovecraft invited his readers to join him as "colonizers of dreams," to use Peter S. Beagle's phrase, in reference to Tolkien (a vastly different writer and thinker). Of course, these dreams are nightmares -- and that, for Lovecraft, and for many of us, is reality.

Lovecraft was an atheist, a materialist, and had little patience for religious sentiments. Yet he created a troop of "gods" whose provenance extends into the pre-human past, and whose concerns are so far beyond the life of humanity as to make the latter of little consequence -- except as unwitting tools to further the supra-cosmic schemes of these deities. The terms "gods" and "deities" are used for convenience; these beings are, in Lovecraft's fiction, "extraterrestrials from the depths of space," as prominent Lovecraft scholar S. T. Joshi puts it, "and their encounters with human beings are largely a product of chance." Of course, they have their human worshippers, or partners, who seem to be seeking some kind of vicarious power of their own by aiding these supremely lofty beings; the ancient witch Keziah (in "Dreams in the Witch House") and the death-defying necromancer Joseph Curwen (in The Case of Charles Dexter Ward) are two memorable examples of individuals who trafficked with Those from Outside and gained real, albeit temporary, power. Significantly, in the context of Lovecraft's art, the gods and their devotees are not merely characters in horror stories; they serve "a largely symbolic function -- they [are] metaphors for the essential unknowability of a boundless universe that human science, for all its tremendous advances, can never fully grasp" (S. T. Joshi, Introduction to H. P. Lovecraft, The Complete Cthulhu Mythos Tales, New York: Fall River Press 2013).

Of the dominant themes in Lovecraft's fiction, transference of consciousness, or "mind exchange," is the most effective, for these tales speak directly to a concern with personal identity in an increasingly de-personalized world -- a concern as urgent and troubling in Lovecraft's time as it is in our own (but, alas, ignored by our society of zombified petty technocrats who happily "tweet" their way to dusty death). In "The Thing on the Doorstep" an old wizard, Ephraim Waite, to achieve a sort of immortality, uses magical arts to transfer his consciousness to the body of his daughter, Asenath. But finding a female body unsatisfactory, Ephraim / Asenath preys upon Edward Derby, an awkward, studious youth with a brilliant mind -- and interested in all things occult. Unsuspecting Edward falls in love with the not uncomely Asenath (dark and pretty, but with rather bulging eyes), also an occultist -- but of a rather more enterprising kind -- and they eventually marry. The narrator, named Upton, who is Edward's closest and only real friend, soon becomes concerned over the strange behavior of the uxorious Edward, who seems to be under Asenath's control, in a less than salubrious manner. At first she seems simply to wear the pants in the family, but after a while it is clear that she controls, literally, Edward's very thoughts and speech, and even actions. After a series of disturbing and dangerous incidents -- including a harrowing late-night car ride from a remote region where some devilry was taking place, during which Edward is possessed by Asenath / Ephraim in mid-trip -- it becomes clear that Asenath / Ephraim is slowly taking total possession of Edward, and will soon inhabit his body completely. Due to what appears to be the behavior of a mentally disturbed person, Edward is confined to an asylum; of course, no asylum can thwart the wizard, despite the fact that Edward, in a desperate effort to save himself, had already killed Asenath -- that is, her body. Her mind, or rather the mind of Ephraim (able to remain intact, so to speak, even after the destruction of the body), manages to transfer to Edward's body, and send his (Edward's) consciousness into the dead body of Asenath, which Edward had dumped in a cellar of an abandoned house. Through an immense effort of will, Edward (in Asenath's decaying body) drags himself to his friend Upton's doorstep, where the extent of the horror is finally revealed. Upton, to rid the world of the threat of Ephraim, goes to the asylum where he "[sends] six bullets through the head of [his] best friend." Of course, it is his best friend's body with Ephraim's mind inside.

Lovecraft has been criticized for the absence of wholesome women in his tales. Indeed, the only female characters we encounter are wicked old crones, like Keziah, degenerate backwood bumpkins (hapless Lavinia, in "The Dunwich Horror"), or a female body with an evil male mind (Asenath). In an effort to account, psychologically, for the absence of desirable female flesh -- or at least intelligent, capable women -- in his tales, the details of Lovecraft's life and love have been exhaustively sifted and recorded by scholars, for those who are interested: his upbringing by coddling female relatives; relocation to New York City and a two-year marriage to an attractive, upwardly mobile woman, Sonia Haft Greene, who was, apparently, too much for the studious and retiring Howard to handle (although she did offer, in an interview given when Lovecraft had attained posthumous fame, the rather odd compliment that he was "an adequately excellent lover"); and his eventual retreat back to his beloved Providence, where he dwelt in seclusion (excepting the occasional road trip), alone with the fantastic thoughts that filled his poetic mind. It was at this point, arguably, that he produced his best work.

I do not consider a tale like "The Thing on the Doorstep" to be an expression of misogyny or a fear of powerful, confident women. Rather, I find in that story a genuine concern with personal intellectual integrity, even a fear of losing that unique cast of mind that makes one a person -- a unique, unrepeatable entity, as purveyors of personalist philosophy like to say. The experience of falling in love -- and this is an experience that Lovecraft surely had, regardless of his inability to cultivate that love -- is jarring, to say the least: we feel dislocated, albeit in a blissful way, and when we regain some power of self-reflection we find that we are changed; our focus is on the beloved and our private thoughts and desires are transformed through union with another person who, to resort to a cliché, completes us. Those of us with an artistic temperament may soon feel the burden of our attachment to this "other," and strive to re-assert our uniqueness, the solitary power of our intellect. If we feel that we are really losing something essential to our self, through an all-consuming love, a crisis occurs, and a decision must be made. The power of Lovecraft's tale, the potent symbolism, resides in Edward's inability to escape and regain his selfhood, his personhood. Unhappy marriages, where one (or both) of the spouses feels trapped and hopeless, are unfortunately a common occurrence in our society. When one succumbs to the social pressure to marry and breed children, at the expense of one's loftier desires -- to perhaps create something from the store of private ideas waiting to find a partner-demiurge to bring them into the realm of being -- one has indeed lost oneself. It is worth noting that some of Lovecraft's most claustrophobic and morbidly desperate tales, such as "He," and "The Horror at Red Hook" were products of his marriage experience.

Lovecraft worked with the general theme of transference of consciousness in several other tales such as "The Call of Cthulhu," in which a "psychically hypersensitive" youth named Wilcox (a sculptor of rare talent) succumbs to a seizure, during the aftermath of which he enters a "delirium" and experiences strange dreams of "some terrible Cyclopean vista of dark and dripping stone, with a subterrene voice ... shouting ... two sounds ... 'Cthulhu' and 'R'lyeh'." Wilcox, deliriously inspired, makes a clay bas-relief of a "monster of vaguely anthropoid outline, but with an octopus-like head whose face was a mass of feelers, a scaly rubbery-looking body, prodigious claws on hind and fore feet, and long, narrow wings behind." He shows this bas-relief to an aged and highly respected anthropologist, Professor Angell, who studies it "with almost frantic intensity," but is slow to recognize the "hieroglyphics and pictorial design." (The good professor dies after being jostled by "a nautical-looking negro" who apparently had a connection to the ancient cult whose blasphemous intentions the good professor was on the way to exposing.) The image, of course, is of the fabulously ancient god Cthulhu, who is not dead but sleeping, and ready to rise from the depths of ocean when the stars are right. The hieroglyphs, as is later discovered, are the prophetic words: "In his house at R'lyeh dead Cthulhu waits dreaming." Whatever doubts the skeptical narrator (Thurston, nephew of Professor Angell) had about the ancient -- or more properly, interstellar -- provenance of the young sculptor's obviously modern production are shaken by the discovery of an almost exact replica, of undeniable antiquity and perhaps even extraterrestrial origin, discovered by a New Orleans detective during a raid on a particularly vicious and loathsome cult (apparently the one responsible for rubbing out the nosey Professor). What's more, it is discovered that the sculptor was not alone in his delirium and visions; from March 22 to April 2 (the period of his delirium) others reported similar experiences. A laborious review of newspaper cuttings from those weeks revealed that average people reported nothing, and men of science were only slightly affected, if at all, but: "It was from the artists and poets that the pertinent answers came." These answers corroborated the growing suspicion that some sort of intra-cosmic event had occurred, or was about to occur, that would lead to the rejuvenation of Cthulhu, and the overwhelming and domination of the earth. The transference of consciousness in this tale does not involve a malignant human being on a personal quest for immortality or ultimate magus status (as in The Case of Charles Dexter Ward); it is rather a cosmic transference, a visitation of a wholly alien consciousness upon sensitive souls capable of communicating the message of this usurping consciousness in the most effective manner possible -- hence the preference of the supra-cosmic entities for artists or other sensitive, introspective types that we find in other tales, such as "The Shadow out of Time."

"The Call of Cthulhu" ends, rather disappointingly, with the octopoid monstrosity, emerged from his deep sea tomb, assaulting a wayward Norwegian vessel and "like Polypheme cursing the fleeing ship of Odysseus ... [but] bolder than the storied Cyclops, great Cthulhu slid greasily into the water and began to pursue with vast wave-raising strokes of cosmic potency." But alas, Cthulhu, the deathless god of immemorial age, ends up getting smashed apart by the ship, when the brave captain makes a final, desperate move to escape. The prose here at the finale is as finely crafted and attuned to the action as anything Lovecraft ever wrote; but the defeat, albeit temporary, of a being so potent that it can not only never truly die, but use its mental power to influence the actions of humans through dreams, amnesia, and delirium -- the defeat of such a formidable aeon-defying entity by getting a ship rammed through it (of course, Cthulhu immediately "recombines" himself, but his prey nevertheless escapes) is too much like the ending of a cheesy contemporary horror film, and not worthy of Lovecraft. For someone who had read and deeply admired the work of Edgar Allan Poe, the phantasmal, oneiric, feverishly ecstatic closing of The Narrative of A. Gordon Pym should have been revisited for inspiration.

Another transference tale, which is quite worthy of Lovecraft -- in fact, I consider it his best work -- is the novella The Case of Charles Dexter Ward. Here we encounter a young man who has spent his life reveling in the antiquities of history-drenched Providence, wandering and daydreaming up and down its precipitous streets, and in the narrow lanes and hidden courtyards, the atmospheres of which change suddenly and almost magically with the shifting of the sun, producing a mesmeric dance of shadows and light. I have been to Providence, several times -- unfortunately it is now built up into a rather cluttered and bustling business and consumer center -- and followed in Lovecraft's footsteps. I watched the sunset wash with pale gold the Christian Science dome at the top of Stamper's Hill, and felt a luxurious melancholy as the street lamps began to twinkle in the deepening dusk. The gentle trickle of the Providence River accompanied me as I traversed the little park adjacent to the magisterial State House, seeking the spot that was once Olney Court (according to the records I consulted at the Athenaeum) where the alchemist and necromancer Joseph Curwen built his first house after wisely relocating to tolerant Providence from witch-crazed Salem. There is nothing there now, except an overpass; so I wended my way along Benefit Street and up "vertical Jenckes Street," making a right onto "sleepy Congdon Street" and finally to Prospect Terrace, with its statue of Roger Williams, founder of the colony, at which point I stood at the railing as the sun began to set, and gazed out over the gently rolling country beyond Federal Hill, imagining, like Lovecraft, vistas of faery wonder and shuddering delight just beyond the edge of sight. When darkness fell, I strolled slowly up the precipitous lanes to stately Brown University, where the John Hay Library preserves the manuscripts and typescripts of our illustrious scribe of squamous blasphemies.

Yes, the atmosphere of the town is enough to stimulate poetical fancies -- and elaborate Lovecraftian diction. To know that Poe himself sat in St. John's Cemetery and composed inebriate love letters to Sarah Helen Whitman makes one -- at least it made me -- feel literary, romantic, and decadent, all at the same time. I sat in that cemetery at midnight, with a bottle of Scotch and a fine cigar, and wrote a cute little poem to my sweetheart of the moment. I can't recall what she said when I read it to her; but I am sure it contributed something to the fading of our summer. It is fitting, then, that the most subtle and disturbing transference of consciousness in Lovecraft's oeuvre should have occurred in this ancient town.

Charles Dexter Ward, we are told, had always been an antiquarian, living more in the past than in the present; he had few friends, and eschewed the sports and other boyish amusements of his fellows in favor of books and daydreams, with the result that he was often alone -- and preferred it that way. At one point during his genealogical researches, he came across the name Joseph Curwen, and discovered, quite by accident (two sheets of an old journal had been pasted together, and the pages re-numbered, to hide the record of Curwen's marriage to an ancestor on Charles's mother's side) that this man, who had died under mysterious circumstances shortly before the Revolutionary War, was great-great-plus grandfather to Charles. So, as was "natural," he began an exhaustive and rather obsessive search for more information on this elusive person, whose activities had been systematically struck from the city's records. Intoxicated by the mystery, Charles went in full force gale -- and his efforts paid off.

After discovering, in a record left accidentally intact, that Curwen had built a house in Olney Court shortly after his relocation from Salem to Providence, Charles goes to investigate that house (still standing in Lovecraft's time) and discovers that a portrait of Curwen had been executed by a famous painter of the day, on a panel above a fireplace in what had been the drawing room. Excited beyond all reason, Charles engages the help of a qualified expert to uncover and restore the portrait, which had been painted over many years ago, and discovers, to his shock and delight, that Joseph Curwen is Charles's spitting image -- indeed, it is like looking in a mirror. Charles's father is equally impressed, and pays to have the painting restored and given to Charles as a present, against the protestations of Charles's mother, whose intuition was operating at full capacity (she is the only female character in Lovecraft's oeuvre to display natural intelligence and even a bit of courage; but her part is quite small). So the entire fireplace is removed (the tenants of the house properly reimbursed) and installed in Charles's study. But wait, there's more. In a small cubby hole discovered after the removal of the fireplace, Charles finds a bundle of papers, most of them in cipher; but one notebook catches his attention, and provokes him to secrecy. The title of the little book is "To the One Who Shall Come After." This cache contains Curwen's journal, and instructions on how to utilize certain alchemical and necromantic arts for the purpose of raising the dead, specifically the long-departed Curwen.

All of this, we come to discover, has been brought about through a spell that Curwen cast before his demise; a spell that would filter through the centuries, and fasten upon the proper victim -- that is, poor Charles -- whose mind would then be turned to old things. Under the spell's influence Charles unwittingly did the bidding of Curwen; he sought out and found Curwen's grave, dug up his remains, and following the instructions in the cryptic texts discovered behind the fireplace in the house in Olney Court, resurrected the ancient necomancer. Now Curwen is back again, ready to reconnect with his two old cronies (still alive after numerous centuries, biding their time in Prague and Transylvania) and begin again their ghoulish rifling of the world's ancient tombs in a quest for supreme knowledge which will unlock secrets no mortal could possibly comprehend -- except to know that ultimate purpose of this bone-swapping bodes no good for the human race.

Whatever illusions Charles may have harbored of a glorious partnership with his undead ancestor are quickly shattered when Curwen begins vampirizing the neighborhood (apparently to get his strength up) against Charles's weak and impotent protestations; duly cowed, Charles can only sit by helplessly when Curwen digs up the grave of an old enemy, resurrects the fellow, and exacts a horrible revenge. Eventually, irritated with Charles's "squeamishness," Curwen murders the lad, stuffs him inside the cupboard of the very fireplace above which his picture once stared out at the world (it had crumbled to dust at the moment of Curwen's resurrection), and sets about posing as Charles, purchasing a bungalow in a nearby town, right above the spot where Curwen once had his farmhouse and subterranean dungeon and wizard's workshop back in the eighteenth century. (The farmhouse is, of course, long gone, but the dungeon and alchemist's workshop remain.) This attempt at subterfuge leads to problems: the handwriting is different, raising eyebrows at Charles's bank; "Charles's" memory is quite impaired, being more acute in matters of antiquarian interest than in the normal business of the contemporary world in which he suddenly found himelf. Feeble efforts by Curwen / Charles to play "catch-up," as it were, by reading contemporary newspapers and magazines, did little to prevent his removal to an asylum. Confident, and rightly so, that this removal would only be temporary, given his extraordinary intelligence, "Charles" quietly acquiesces, and is soon free again, after demonstrating normal mental function, apart from the inexplicable memory loss and altered penmanship.

Back at the bungalow, the necromantic operations resume in earnest. The climax of this tale is what S. T. Joshi refers to as a "conventional good versus evil battle" between a valiant human (Charles's physician) and the demented Curwen, intent on ... Well, intent on what? We get references to entities from "Outside," but their role is never really clear. All we know is that Curwen, and his buddies in Prague and Transylvania, are practicing a very ancient and powerful form of necromancy that involves the gathering of bones of illustrious men of old, the reduction of these bones to their "essential salts," and by some alchemical operation the resurrection, in full bodily form, of these long-dead prophets, seers, and sages of the ancient world, for the purpose of gaining -- by persuasion, gentle or otherwise -- all the knowledge that they possess. It is left to the reader to imagine what these death-defying wizards will do with all that accumulated wisdom. In any case, the physician, Dr. Willet, who unlike his colleagues still has a spark of imagination, unravels the mystery, discovers Charles's corpse stuffed inside the cupboard, and sets out to destroy Curwen.

Lovecraft's description of Dr. Willett's trek through the noisome dungeon beneath the bungalow is a droning dirge of horror, in which darksome chords of ancestral memory are relentlessly struck. The sickening, vaguely humanoid, though "incomplete," creatures imprisoned in oubliettes -- these creatures, we are told, have been shrieking and bellowing in those lightless tombs since Curwen's demise over a century ago -- inspire both nausea and pity. They are the result of experiments carried out by Curwen as he was perfecting his art; they cannot die, and they do not even need to eat -- but they want to, desperately. Curwen's cruelty shocks Dr. Willett, and drives him on to his goal. Eventually, after discovering the formulae for raising up and putting down, Willett memorizes the latter, and pays Curwen a visit at the asylum, where he is once again being held (apparently one cannot have the bones of illustrious men delivered to one's home in a quiet suburban neighborhood without attracting negative attention). We know what is going to happen. After a brief but effective upbraiding, Willett speaks the magic words, and Curwen crumbles into a fine bluish-gray dust, and is swept out the window by a refreshing breeze. The End.

My synopsis, of course, cannot do justice to the starkly realized atmosphere of this mini-masterpiece. The middle section, a flashback to the pre-Revolutionary era, tells us of Curwen's life; his efforts to hit upon the formula that would enable him to return as another, in the event of his death; and the manner in which his increasingly bold experiments in the black arts led finally to the mustering of a posse to either bring him to justice, or destroy him if necessary. Despite the efforts of the well-armed and seasoned colonists who marched on his farmhouse, it was by no human hand that Curwen was undone. He called upon, we are told, something that demanded too much of him. But the spell had been cast, and the fate of Charles Dexter Ward sealed, long before his birth. In this section, Lovecraft puts his wide reading in colonial American history -- especially that of his beloved Rhode Island -- to excellent use as he conjures the style and texture of both seventeenth and eighteenth century life in that New England colony, founded and occupied by bold dissenters -- at least some of whom might have had interests not unlike Curwen's.

While this tale does not, strictly speaking, involve a one-to-one transference of consciousness, it is a subtle and well-wrought variation on that theme. The mind of Curwen never actually enters Charles, but the influence of Curwen's spell, or, to de-mythologize the tale, his will, takes complete control of Charles's life, rendering him an unwitting slave to Curwen. The much-discussed "cosmic perspective" of many of Lovecraft's tales, particularly those in the so-called Cthulhu Mythos cycle, is barely present in this tale. The focus is on a single terrible individual; one who had managed to extend his life far beyond the natural length, and then return to continue his unholy occupation. Whatever nebulous entities outside the space-time continuum that he may have trucked with is of little concern in this tale of fascinating morbidity and curdling ghoulishness.

As a work of literature, The Case of Charles Dexter Ward succeeds precisely because its focus is not on "cosmic" terrors, but on a disruption of natural human existence in a single place, involving a small group of people. The perspective is temporal, not cosmic. Curwen's long life, which extended from the late seventeenth century well into the eighteenth -- making him nearly a century old when he finally succumbed to his own dread allies -- and the persistence of his will well into the twentieth century, is, in my opinion, a more unsettling thing to contemplate than ancient extraterrestrial "gods" sleeping beneath the sea waiting patiently for the time when they will be able to re-conquer the world. Evil that is brought about by, and centers upon, a single person is always more disturbing and worthy of moral reflection than evil wrought by un-human beings that occupy an entirely different sphere of reality than our own. Lovecraft asks, in this tale, rhetorically: What antiquarian, given the knowledge of an ancestor like Curwen, would have done anything less than embark upon an exhaustive research of that person? And we may ask, after reading this text: Possessed of Curwen's abilities and ancient knowledge, would I have done anything less than pursue my power to the utmost end? The hope and joy of a scholar is to learn as much as possible in the short time we have on this "placid island of ignorance"; and if one is an atheist who does not believe in the continuation of our life or consciousness after the shedding of this mortal coil, then the fantasy of prolonging our life through ghoulish means for the sake of boundless knowledge does not seem so dark.

* * * * *

The materialist Lovecraft did not believe in the concept of salvation, at least not in the traditional, religious sense. Yet in some of his later tales, the transference of consciousness theme is less terrifying than awe-inspiring, if unsettling; however, for those of us who desire knowledge above all else, I think we would gladly submit to the type of transference that occurs in "The Shadow out of Time," and consider it salvation, a redemption from post-literate panderers of unprocessed data and their diarrhetic devices. In this tale we encounter an extraterrestrial "Great Race," wondrously advanced beings who value knowledge and a peaceful way of life; they do not seek a dominion of chaos like Cthulhu and others of his ilk, but only the perpetuation of their race. These beings are capable of casting their minds forward and backward in time, and they have the ability to exchange minds with certain intellectually gifted beings from various epochs of our world and others, for the sake of acquiring a comprehensive knowledge of the entire life and history of the solar system. When the mind of a member of the Great Race occupies the body of a person in the past or future, the displaced mind, now occupying the conical body of his displacer, is gently pressed into service as an historian in the Race's vast archives.

From their outpost on planet earth, 150 million years in the "past" (linear time has no meaning for these achronological entities), the Great Race maintains an ever-growing library that is a scholar's wet dream, where displaced minds from numerous ages, past and present, copy out the histories of their respective ages. The narrator, Nathaniel Wingate Peaslee (Lovecraft had quite a way with names), after emerging from a five-year bout of amnesia, during which time his mind was wafted down the corridors of time to the Great Race's headquarters in the Mesozoic age, begins -- despite the mental block set in place before his return -- to have increasingly vivid dream-recollections of his stint as a scribe for the aliens. If there is such a thing as salvation for a scholarly atheist, this would be it:

In the dreams I now moved bodily among the other unknown entities, reading terrible books from the endless shelves ... There were horrible annals of other worlds and other universes, and of stirrings of formless life outside of all universes. There were records of strange orders of beings which had peopled the world in forgotten pasts, and frightful chronicles of grotesque-bodied intelligences which would people it millions of years after the death of the last human being. And I learned chapters of human history whose existence no scholar of today has ever expected.

Peaslee also has conversations with minds from stupefyingly remote epochs of our world, which one might compare with the heaven envisaged by the Neoplatonic Christian philosopher Origen of Alexandria (185-254 C.E.), in which deserving souls will be educated little by little, over the course of numerous aeons, until at last they reach God, in whose presence they will contemplate the infinite mysteries of creation (cf. Origen, On First Principles 2.11.6-7). In Lovecraft's vision, however, the education does not inspire hosannahs but rather a mute absorption of "shocking secrets and dizzying marvels."

I talked with the mind of Yiang-Li, a philosopher from the cruel empire of Tsan-Chan, which is to come in A.D. 5000; with that of a general of the great-headed brown people who held South Africa in B.C. 50,000; with that of a twelfth-century Florentine monk named Bartolomeo Corsi ... with that of Nug-Soth, a magician of the dark conquerors of A.D. 16,000 ...

And many others, including an Egyptian who told him "the hideous secret of Nyarlathotep" and later, a recollection of "a half-plastic denizen of the hollow interior of an unknown trans-Plutonian planet eighteen million years in the future." The vast gulfs of time that the Great Race are capable of traversing and, most importantly for the impact of the tale, the immense number and variety of lives and cultures and civilizations that will come into being long after our own has passed away, are to me less inspiring of fright than of awe, or what Longinus or Edmund Burke would call "the sublime." As S. T. Joshi has written of this tale, "Lovecraft has shifted his focus from horror to awe and wonder, and this is the most unequivocally science-fictional of his later narratives." That these strange, amoral, but benign beings are taking the trouble to record "the whole history, past and future, of the cosmic space-time continuum" makes them the greatest of humanists -- or perhaps we should call them "super-humanists." At this point in the tale there is nothing really frightful, apart from the growing realization that what Peaslee wishes to take for a psychological malady is, in fact, all too real. But even then, would an atheist and materialist really be shocked or frightened to discover that other, more highly developed beings exist in our immeasurable universe?

The more I contemplate this story -- and it is one of Lovecraft's most artistically polished and thought-provoking -- the more I am struck by the unreasonable fear that grips Peaslee, the narrator, who had the great fortune (in my view) to have been chosen to make the mental -- and at the end of the tale, physical -- journey to the center of learning of the Great Race. Granted, the Great Race were not alone in their Cyclopean (to use a Lovecraftian adjective) city; there were evil "Elder Things" that had been subdued, aeons ago, by the Great Race, and relegated to underground caverns -- only there were dark hints that these terrible beings would eventually break free and exact a hideous revenge. But even this rather remote danger would not, I think, be sufficient to curb the investigative enthusiasm of a genuine scholar.

During the climax of the story, when Peaslee journeys to a place in Australia where monolithic blocks have been discovered that are identical to those he has dreamed about for years -- the building blocks of the megalithic city of the Great Race -- he succumbs to an urge to descend into an underground cavern that is the ruined but still recognizable city of his dream flashbacks (the evil Elder Things apparently had their revenge). He knows every twist and turn of the place, and makes his way to the archives, where he seeks confirmation of the reality of his experience.

There, said the dreams and legends, had reposed the whole history, past and future, of the cosmic space-time continuum -- written by captive minds from every orb and every age in the solar system. Madness, of course -- but had I not now stumbled into a nighted world as mad as I?

On the way he glimpses the dark, windowless basalt towers that were associated with the feared Elder Things. He presses on and at last discovers the section of the library he was seeking. Grabbing hold of a familiar volume, bound in a metal case, he takes a look inside -- and loses control. In a frenzy, he takes off for the surface. On the way, he hears the piping voices of the terrible Elder Things, and at his back there is a wind that seems to be tugging at him, "like a noose or lasso." With great effort he makes it out of the cavern -- after losing the metal-bound volume, of course -- and staggers, half senseless, to his camp. The revelation that he finds so mind-blastingly horrible is what we had anticipated: "I saw that the queerly pigmented letters on the brittle, aeon-browned cellulose pages [of the volume in the metal case] were not indeed any nameless hieroglyphs of earth's youth. They were, instead, the letters of our own familiar alphabet, spelling out the words of the English language in my own handwriting."

Throughout this tale, we are given to understand that the Great Race, while utterly alien and in possession of powers beyond human comprehension, are not at all evil; they are scientists, artists, and rather enlightened politicians. (Lovecraft describes their form of government as "a sort of fascistic socialism," but it seems more like an oligarchy or perhaps a meritocracy with some Marxist principles thrown in. Lovecraft was, as is well documented, extremely naive in matters of politics, when he was not downright bigotted and racist.) While there is something less than ethical in their mental invasions of unsuspecting bodies, we are told that the Great Race treated displaced minds with the utmost kindness. Peaslee himself was returned safely to his own age, mental faculties unimpaired -- except, of course, for the dreams, which were only terrifying because he apparently had a rather neurotic attachment to the safety zone of his own circumscribed spatio-temporal existence. This neurosis is revealed in the following outburst, after he had emerged from the "abyss":

Had I, in full hideous fact, been drawn back to a pre-human world of a hundred and fifty million years ago in those dark, baffling days of the amnesia? Had my present body been the vehicle of a frightful alien consciousness from palaeogean gulfs of time? Had I, as the captive mind of those shambling horrors, indeed known that accursed city of stone in its primordial heyday, and wriggled down those familiar corridors in the loathsome shape of my captor? Were those tormenting dreams of more than twenty years the offspring of stark, monstrous memories? Had I once veritably talked with minds from reachless corners of time and space, learned the universe's secrets past and to come, and written the annals of my own world for the metal cases of those titan archives?

The Great Race were indeed strange, but I fail to see them as "shambling horrors." Here, perhaps, is Lovecraft's well-known xenophobia coloring a tale that is far less of horror than of a triumph of human knowledge -- or at least could have been if it had been written from a different set of assumptions. A salvation from ignorance, a redemption from the limitations of our humanity -- this is something for which all true scholars strive. As a materialist and atheist myself, I would gladly exchange (hypothetically, for we are dealing with myths -- one modern and the other originating in the Bronze Age) an eternity of singing praises to a genocidal dictator of a god for a mere afternoon in the titanic archives of the Great Race. To spend an eternity contemplating "the universe's secret past and present" ... well, I would face an army of Elder Things to achieve that salvation. And perhaps I would meet, in that library of libraries, the great humanist Origen, a Christian in spite of himself.

There is one fear, however, that would prevent me from seeking the secrets of the cosmos; and that is having my brain removed, placed in a canister, and shipped across the vast universe to the home of aliens that I do not entirely trust. Such is the theme of "The Whisperer in Darkness." This story is not, strictly speaking, a transference of consciousness, or mind swap, tale; the human who agrees to have his brain sent across illimitable gulfs of the universe, to a dark planet where promises of great revelations will somehow be fulfilled, will be entirely at the mercy of rather dubious aliens. As a literary work, intended to produce an unsettling effect, it succeeds quite admirably. The atmosphere of northern New England (specifically Vermont) is evoked with superb clarity and provides an excellent aesthetic backdrop for the real physical danger that besets both the narrator and the hapless fellow whose brain ends up in a canister.

As a writer, Lovecraft was caught between two worlds, as it were: that of the pulp magazines -- which demanded sensationalism and a goodly dose of "chills and thrills" -- in which most of his stories were published, and his private world of fantasy that was not mere capricious daydreaming but an intellectual milieu where he grappled with an ever-shifting personal philosophy that had atheistic materialism at its base. But Lovecraft also clung to notions of otherworldly beauty accessed in dreams and revealed partially in the pastoral landscapes of his beloved New England, where remnants of the colonial era could still be found in hidden courtyards and untended gardens of ancient houses.

In some ways, Lovecraft was a Romantic, despite his avowed preference for the poetry of the Augustan age, with its heroic couplets that he attempted (painfully) to imitate in his younger years. His mature prose poems, however, are worthy accomplishments, notably "Nyarlathotep," an eschatological nightmare of wreckless abandonment in a dying world, written immediately after emerging from a dream; "Ex Oblivione," an effusion of stark cosmic pessimism in the face of a bland infinity; and especially the haunting, elegiac "Azathoth," which tells of "a man who travelled out of life on a quest into the spaces whither the world's dreams had fled." Alone in his quest, in an aged world in which "wonder [had gone] out of the minds of men," the solitary seeker dwells in a sad room that looks out upon "a dim court where other windows stared in dull despair." Knowing that such a grim environment would soon drive him to madness, the lone quester begins to lean far out his window and call upon the stars by name,

And one night a mighty gulf was bridged, and the dream-haunted skies swelled down to the lonely watcher's window to merge with the close air of his room and make him part of their fabulous wonder. ... [A]nd for days not counted in men's calendars the tides of far spheres bare him gently to join the dreams for which he longed; the dreams that men have lost. And in the course of many cycles they tenderly left him sleeping on a green sunrise shore; a green shore fragrant with lotus-blossoms and starred by red camalotes.

This is fine poetry, in the Romantic mood. Note the subtle alliteration and the hint of dactyls amidst the iambs, providing a dreamy lilting quality that is prose poetry (a rare form in our day) at its best. This brief masterpiece is indeed a deeply personal elegy for the past glory of a childhood that lasted well into adulthood, as many commentators have noted (often unkindly); it is also an expression of salvific hope by a writer who wandered long in "a wild weird clime that lieth, sublime, / Out of SPACE -- out of TIME" (Poe, "Dream-Land").

Thursday, January 22, 2015

Free Speech and / or Intelligent Criticism

© Edward Moore 2015

In a letter to his friend, Arnold Ruge, the young Karl Marx made a call for "a merciless criticism of everything existing, merciless in two senses: this criticism must not be afraid of its own conclusions and must not shrink from a collision with the established powers." These words were shocking and subversive in 1843; they are not so now. Rather, today, criticism is accepted as a necessary component of all disciplines, including politics and religion. We in the West have gotten so used to criticism that it is taught in schools and universities, demanded in the workplace (where it is usually labeled "positive feedback," or some such euphemism), and maintains a more or less quiet presence in all areas of society. When criticism in our day collides with the establishment, it is usually in the form of popular movements, like "Occupy Wall Street," or through more coherent organizations like the Tea Party. The collision, then, is not so much a social upheaval as it is a moment in a continuing dialogue, or perhaps 'polylogue'. As for being afraid of conclusions, I believe that this applies only to the private thinker, who does not have the backing of an organization. When I hesitate, for whatever reason, to share certain ideas directly with my fellows, it is usually because I am afraid of being misunderstood or even attacked. If I should, however, by utilizing the tools of our technocratic era, discover a significant number of people who share my conclusions, I will likely communicate with them, in a more or less systematic fashion. And, in our age of digital anonymity, I need not fear any backlash should my words dismay or offend -- unless, of course, I am calling for something like violent action against ill-trained and incompetent law enforcement officers, or, need I say it, jihad. In such cases, my words are in danger of being treated as actions, and then I will be placing my hand to my lips, bidding my freedom adieu (anonymity is, of course, an ever-eroding shore). Barring such extremes, if one is sufficiently passionate about his or her views, and wishes to "make a difference," one may even start a 'movement'. As Kierkegaard pointed out, over 150 years ago, an individual with crowd-pleasing ideas, no matter how half-baked or insane, may be given the stamp of legitimacy if a significant number of people parrot him.

[T]he daily press and anonymity make our age even more insane with help from 'the public', which is really an abstraction, which makes a claim to be the court of last resort in relation to 'the truth'; for assemblies which make this claim surely do not take place. That an anonymous person, with help from the press, day in and day out can speak however he pleases (even with respect to the intellectual, the ethical, the religious), things which he perhaps did not in the least have the courage to say personally in a particular situation; every time he opens up his gullet -- one cannot call it a mouth -- he can all at once address himself to thousands upon thousands; he can get ten thousand times ten thousand to repeat after him - and no one has to answer for it ... (Kierkegaard, "The Crowd is Untruth," 1847)

Unless, of course, the line separating words from action is crossed. In the domain of words, the ideas communicated thereby maintain their hold on the minds of readers or hearers to the extent that these ideas are, if not convincing, at least compelling and worthy of serious consideration. Ethically, the assumption is held that the intention of the communication is serious; the purpose is not to sophistically incite emotion, but to philosophically engage with the intellect, for the sake of deepening understanding and, ultimately, improving the human condition. For this, an atmosphere of respect is required; brutish intimidation or, the worst, outright physical violence, has no place. Speech, of course, when it is sophistical -- that is, not meant to convince through reason but to persuade through emotion -- occupies a sort of gray area between words and action. Sophism often relies upon not-so-subtle demeaning of whatever ideas (and the people who hold them) oppose the view being promoted. Open insults of the most sophomoric kind are defended by appealing to our ideal of free speech. This is disingenuous. Insults are not "speech-acts" but invitations to extra-linguistic response. Sophists often say things from the safety of their private "electronic device" or from the podium of a university conference room that they would never say, for example, at a neighborhood bar. No one has ever gained a deeper understanding of life, or found his or her condition as a human being improved, by looking down the barrel of a gun. Nor, for that matter, has anyone ever felt compelled to engage in a self-critique of his or her deeply held beliefs after seeing those beliefs mocked or 'satirized'. Granted, verbal or visual insults are less destructive -- to individuals in particular and to the fabric of society in general -- than physical violence. Yet one betrays a sad lack of psychological insight when one fails to understand how insults can trigger violent reaction -- especially among persons who feel, rightly or wrongly, that they have been systematically degraded and marginalized.

Every intelligent thinker wants to, and strives to, be taken seriously. The time and energy spent cultivating an idea, or a critique of an idea or ideology, takes a heavy emotional and physical toll on the person so engaged. So it is only natural for such a person to become rather attached to his or her intellectual offspring, and wish to see it flourish in the world. And because this offspring is the result of slow and careful rearing -- not, as is often the case among the less mentally astute, slow and careful indoctrination -- involving numerous and sometimes painful corrections, the parent will be more inclined to make further corrections if necessary. Since the entire point of this slow development is to bring into being a communicable concept that will serve as a reference-point, an impetus, for yet further development by others, criticism by others -- even so-called negative criticism -- will not be rejected out of hand or defended against, but accepted and considered and, if warranted, adopted. This is the healthy intellectual climate in which all great ideas have grown. But this will only occur in an atmosphere of respectful discourse. This does not exclude, I hasten to add, occasional levity or jocularity. A too-serious mind will quickly burn itself out. Yet there is a great difference between humor amongst friends, or at least amongst those sharing a common discourse and culture, and humor directed at those occupying a drastically different discursive and cultural realm. In short, it is the difference between laughing with, and laughing at.

It is the height of puerility to engage in mockery of an other's deeply held beliefs and then, when the consequences are too grim to bear, to pull back and say, as so many children do, "I was just kiddin'!" There is an old saying about jokes: If one has to explain a joke, it isn't funny. The beauty of well-reasoned argument is that it is explanation, and is sufficiently open-ended to permit correction in the event of misunderstanding. A joke permits no such thing. Once it is out of the mouth, or on the page (as a cartoon, for example), there is no going back. If the butt of the joke is excessively hurt or offended, there is no way to undo the damage. While there is such a thing as neurotically sensitive people, who just "can't take a joke," we are nevertheless beholden, as rational, ethical beings, to see to it that we remain aware of that sensitivity, and refrain from exacerbating what is surely a source of continual pain for our overly sensitive fellows. This is especially important when the substance of our joking deals not with minor issues such as style of dress or mannerisms, but with major topics involving identity, purpose, and conviction, such as religion and politics. Now such self-censorship is understandable at the dinner table, but is it acceptable in an established society where the sensitivity of a minority swells into a (sometimes violent) clash of cultures?

The intelligent style of criticism I have in mind, while not unique to Western cultures, certainly has no place among adherents of what I shall call pre-Enlightenment thinking. This includes not only so-called radical Islamists, but also fundamentalist Christians, white supremacist groups, ultra-conservatives, and any other group that leaves aside logic and reason for arguments based on emotions and a heavy hand or -- worse! -- divine revelation. So perhaps it is acceptable for those of us who subscribe to Enlightenment ideas (even if we sometimes use the phrase "post-Enlightenment" or some other "post-" to denote a careful critique of Enlightenment excesses) to take a firm and sometimes adversarial stance in the face of drastically opposing ideologies. Tolerance is rather easy to maintain when the "other" is simply desirous of living peacefully at home with his or her ideas; but when the "other" is actively striving to convert others (Has anyone in our post-post-modern world ever actually used "other" as a personal pronoun?) to his or her doctrine and way of life, then tolerance, as both theory and practice, must be subjected to rigorous criticism. As Gore Vidal wrote, in a fine article on "Monotheism and its Discontents" (1992):

Ordinarily, as a descendent of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, which shaped our Republic, I would say live and let live and I would try not to 'scoff' -- to use Lincoln's verb -- at the monotheists. But I am not allowed to ignore them. They won't let me. They are too busy. They have a divine mission to take away our rights as private citizens.

"They" here are, of course, the Christian Right, who were and are attempting to establish a theocracy through political influence. Except for a rather small number of militant groups outside the mainstream, these fundamentalists, as odious as their ideas are, do not resort to physical violence -- even if they are masterful sophists (and sophism, when practiced upon the ignorant and uneducated, is a form of violence). So when Vidal called for "confrontation" with the "sky godders" (as he called adherents of the three monotheistic faiths) he was intending a confrontation of intellect, not of arms. Our contemporary violent jihadists, however, appear to have no interest in talking, so enlightened confrontation is not possible. But a clear articulation of Western ideals is possible, and if communicated to the world through rational discourse instead of propagandistic sloganeering -- or worst of all, military action -- these ideals may, perhaps, gain some respect from the "other," if not wholesale acceptance.

While material progress is still high on our list of desired goals, this has been tempered by considerations of the damage such striving does to the environment and to persons caught up in the mechanization -- and now technologization -- of human life. The idea remains among the enlightened that the development and realization of the authentically human is the highest goal, and indeed purpose, of life. This world is not a staging-ground for heaven, nor is it an opportunity to aggressively force as many people as possible into one's own thought-realm. And, I hasten to add, this applies to us liberal thinkers who often forget how aggressive we can be! As Emerson, in his essay on "Politics" (1844), put it so well, and presciently:

[W]henever I find my dominion over myself not sufficient for me, and undertake the direction of [my neighbor] also, I overstep the truth, and come into false relations to him. I may have so much more skill or strength than he that he cannot express adequately his sense of wrong, but it is a lie, and hurts like a lie both him and me. Love and nature cannot maintain the assumption: it must be executed by a practical lie, namely, by force. This undertaking for another, is the blunder which stands in colossal ugliness in the governments of the world.

To force another to follow one's own direction is not only a lie, it is an act of violence. Criticism seeks to do one of two things: persuade, or convince. The ancient Sophists used fine speech and an elastic style of argument to lead the minds of their hearers to where they wanted them to go -- this is persuasion, and it only works upon the unsuspecting, or the insufficiently educated. Socrates, Plato and his followers used logic -- dialectic -- to demonstrate the falsity of every idea that was in competition with their own, and thereby convince. In this supremely humanistic agon, the mind was the final judge; truth, as Plato insisted, is always present in the soul, and requires only a gentle reminder to be brought to the fore. In both cases, as historically divergent as they were, physical violence had no place. We know that the students of Aristotle's Lyceum occasionally ventured across town to mock their peers at Plato's Academy, and we can assume that some fist-fights broke out -- but it was surely nothing remotely close to terrorism. And this juvenile ribbing took place within a shared culture. When Plato took his unique brand of philosophy afield, however, to the court of King Dionysius of Syracuse (which was Greek in language if not in ideals), he ended up giving offense, and was sold into slavery for a time. One can only imagine how Platonism would have fared if it had been taught in the courts of the early caliphs ... Oh wait! It was, with great success. We have the early Islamic commentators and translators to thank for our knowledge of Plato and most of the Classical philosophical, literary, and scientific tradition. Hmmm ...

When discourse is logical, open-ended, constructed in a manner that admits all necessary revision, everyone benefits. Disagreements, instead of becoming fuel for adversity, simply take their place as markers in the ever-growing life of critically engaged persons and cultures (and cultures, of course, are nothing more than large numbers of persons with roughly the same world-view). It is indeed ironic that Christianity, now dominated by fundamentalists (in influence if not in numbers), spent its early centuries tangling with the merciless criticism of pagan philosophers and, after the ascension of Constantine and the legitimization of the faith, with the variety of interpretations proffered by philosophical Christian theologians who had been influenced by the pagan philosophers! Despite the fact that St. Paul himself condemned philosophy as "vain deceit" and warned against the division that comes from intellectual wrangling, early Christians philosophers engaged in remarkably subtle dialectic, especially in the articulation of the Trinity. And for this, they were helped along by the writings of the Platonists, far more than the Bible, which mentions the Trinity only in a single problematical passage (1 John 5:7, occurring in a single sixteenth-century manuscript). This little-studied period of Christian history, the so-called Byzantine era, an intellectually vibrant and even "multi-cultural" period, unfortunately gave way to a fundamentalism that led to the exile of pagan intellectuals as well as unorthodox Christian thinkers, most of whom found welcome in the courts of the caliphs. Early Islamic thinkers found much of value in the Classical writings brought by these exiles, and there was a flowering of scientific, medical, and historical inquiry that was eventually bequeathed upon a benighted Europe. It would be naive to ask, as not a few scholars have, "If then, why not now?" Contemporary fundamentalist Christians and Muslims are wilfully ignorant of history. Since God is all-in-all, the argument goes, there is no need to study history, or any other human science; the divine revelation in our Book tells us all we need to know. Critical debate with such persons is impossible. This does not, however, preclude a persistent communication of humanistic -- as opposed to theistic -- ideals, with the intention not of converting anyone away from their faith, but of encouraging a more humanistic theism, if you will.

. . . . .

In my numerous incarnations, from young Surrealist poet to post-structural theorist to scholar of Christian Neoplatonism to apologist for Orthodox Christianity to (finally) atheist lover of art for art's sake, I have had the opportunity to speak with Muslims from a wide variety of backgrounds, with views conciliatory with the West, hostile to the West, and, occasionally, intelligently critical of all aspects of the complex relationship. My views were always clearly and succinctly stated: I am pro-Western, a child of the Enlightenment and proud of it. Sometimes, especially after a martini or three, I was rather blustery (to put it mildly) in my denunciation of what Vidal memorably called "sky-god religions" -- yet I was never threatened with physical violence. Why? I have already given the answer. Because I was engaged in discourse. As passionate and out-of-hand as I had sometimes gotten, I never stooped to the level of lobbing insults. Perhaps I gave the finger (as did Christopher Hitchens [another indefatigable critic of sky-god-ism], at a memorable 92nd Street Y round table, as I recall) ... but I never mocked. I never drew a cartoon. When I was done spouting, I waited -- for a response. And I listened when it came.

Of course there are those who will remind me that "they" (the terrorists) only respond with violence; open discourse is as alien to those worshippers of a war-god as the related terms "tolerance" and "pluralism." If this were true, would it not be better for those of us privileged to live in an enlightened society to -- instead of repeating boilerplate insults and drawing cartoons -- demonstrate the efficacy of rational thought and discourse? The art of philosophy is, alas, no longer widely practiced in our society, with the result that many academics -- not to mention educated laypersons (very rare, these) -- are incapable of writing clear, open-ended essays, free of jargon, that invite discussion. Many will argue that meaningful discussion, much less authentic debate, is impossible if one of the participants locates absolute authority in a sacred text, instead of seeking authority through the exercise of human reason. This is simply not true. I consider Christian fundamentalists as equally hardy in their devotion to an ancient text as conservative Muslims and Jews. I have held meaningful discussions with conservative representatives of these three religions, on many occasions. The prerequisite for each talk, of course, was careful study of the relevant sacred texts. Admittedly, I am far more familiar with the Hebrew scriptures, and the New Testament, than I am with the Koran -- but I did considerable homework. Even though I am an atheist, I uttered the honorific "peace be upon him" each time I mentioned Mohammed; and my companions showed respect by referring to the authors of the New Testament as "Saint" so-and-so. This is a small thing, and rather meaningless in the realm of ideas, but it is a sign of courtesy, and that faint injection of benign atmosphere permitted an exchange of ideas that was more than just an earnest attempt at cultural and intellectual one-upmanship. A small thing, yes, in this age of violent jihad from the East and Islamophobia from the West, but rather preferable, I think, to juvenile ribbing calling itself satire and using our ideal of free expression to justify mockery of religion. The question, then. Should a cherished freedom -- freedom of speech -- be controlled through intelligent self-censorship? If one cares more about the ethics of intellectual life, the morality of inter-cultural co-existence, than the adolescent I'll-do-what-I-want-when-I-want code of conduct, the answer is yes.

In times of multiple competing voices, a backing-away from particularities in favor of generalities can be helpful. My intention here was only to allude to the Charlie Hebdo massacre and the backlashes in Europe and the Middle East, not to write a commentary on this latest act of violent jihadist terror and the inevitable anti-Islamic response. But a few colleagues have urged me to make some kind of direct statement. So, in closing I will simply say that I condemn all acts of violence, which includes racism, nationalism, and bigotry of all kinds. Any subordination of the person to an ideology, a nation, a political party, a religion, is violence. Cries of "God is Great" are just as offensive to me as shouts of "We are Charlie." My response to such anti-personalistic foolishness is to say, There is no god, I am Edward.

Monday, January 12, 2015

Far Beyond the Personal

A Belated Review of Donna Tartt's The Goldfinch

Edward Moore, PhD (patristics@gmail.com)

This may seem an untimely time to be preoccupied with questions of literature, the novel, and the art of writing in general. The year 2015 has barely begun, and thoughtful persons -- and persons of action (usually, but not always distinct) -- are concerned with police brutality (at the local and national level), the machinations of the so-called Islamic State, freedom of speech (and other Western values) versus fanatical and oppressive ideology, among other important problems. As it should be. Yet for those of us who remain enclosed in a cocoon of self-referentiality or, to use a more accessible term, seasonal depression, the pursuit of beauty -- and the simultaneous escape and self-revelation it provides -- is perhaps the most timely occupation. This is not to say that practicioners of the discursive arts (which includes cinema along with novels, short stories, and plays) have not been busy trying to be timely. Indeed, recognition official and unofficial has been given to works that deal with such perennially timely topics as Nazi-occupied Europe, the American civil rights movement, and the usual coterie of race and gender-themed productions. But, as usual, a foray into the complex psychology of a single human being -- reasonably well-educated, perhaps neurotically sensitive, and prone to highly personal philosophical reflections, oh, and wracked by tragic personal loss (not loss of a nation or a culture -- all abstractions -- but of something endemic to the 'I') -- is a rare find in our post-Romantic, post-post-modern era. 'Tis better to remain with the dead white European (not necessarily) males, in order to retain consciousness of ... well, what makes those of us unfortunate enough to have been born inside the borders of the current waning Empire tick.

With that mindset, I have read, at last, Donna Tartt's much-discussed book (note I have not labeled it a novel -- more on that later) The Goldfinch (2013, New York: Little, Brown and Company). Since I permit myself only a handful of new works of fiction per year, being far more concerned with older, neglected writings, I tend to be a bit behind the times, as it were. I also tend to be very selective. Unless I am contracted to write a professional review, and receive the book directly from the publisher or author's agent, I have no qualms about putting down a work that bores me. I took Donna Tartt's book off the shelf, voluntarily, after having seen it mentioned several times during my casual perusal of literary reviews and magazines. Resting and bored over the Christmas holiday week, I began Tartt's book on a Friday evening -- and completed it the following afternoon. As is my wont, my reading was careful, analytical, but by the time I reached the middle, roughly, of the rather hefty tome (771 pages), I realized I had become emotionally involved. This does not often happen when I read a work of fiction, and only less rarely when I read poetry (I watch movies only when forced by friends). And so it is the highest praise I can give to any work of literary art.

That being said, I nearly put the book down before reaching the definitive crisis of the narrative, the terrorist bombing of the museum and the resultant death of the narrator's beloved mother (p. 31). Excessive first-person reflections about minor details, combined with overwhelming descriptions of persons and things, runs counter to my aesthetic of economy in narrative. Perhaps it is my background as an academic philosopher that causes me to recoil from the no-stone-unturned approach to fictional writing; in philosophy such an approach is the norm, and when I turn to fiction I expect writing that is, well, breezier than typically verbose philosophical essays. But for some reason, I stayed my hand, and continued to read. As with a ponderous Romantic symphony, if one is to appreciate the work, one must allow ones response(s) to unfold at the pace set by the composer. If the composer is astute, and atuned to his themes, the patience will be rewarded. Such is the case with The Goldfinch. One of my first unbidden thoughts, as I followed the course of events, was of Dostoevsky. I immediately checked myself. How dare I compare any work, or writer, to the mad Russian, one of the greatest novelists of all time? Perhaps my emotional response to Tartt's work was clouding my judgment, for there is really nothing about her style, and little more about here theme(s), that justifies a comparison with Dostoevsky. Yet there it was. I vowed at this point to be more critical in my reading; I was clearly losing my objectivity (What?! Isn't the whole point of reading a work of literature to become immersed in the world set up by the author?) Upon reflection, however, I asked myself: Why not? Is Dostoevsky some jealous god? Will I be struck down if I dare to find a contemporary work that is more satisfying for me than The Brothers Karamazov? Yes, The Goldfinch is (sorry) a very different animal; but comparing my first reading of the former with the latter, the personal fact is that my response to Tartt's work was immediate, variegated, and inviting -- after the initial emotional overflow -- of continued reflection (and forget about the false objective / subjective dichotomy. As a philosopher I should know better!). My response to Dostoevsky's masterpiece, as I recall after a space of over twenty years, was rather ... laborious.

During my lifetime my taste in literature has undergone various minor changes, ranging from a youthful love of fantasy and horror (Poe, Dunsany, Lovecraft, and the old Gothic novelists were my mainstays, and Tolkien followed me everywhere), to a fascination with psychopathy and altered states (French Surrealism, the novels of Bataille, the effusions of Artaud) to a current interest in questions of purpose and meaning, as well as personal legacy (recent works by Linda Holeman, Michael Gruber, Sarah Dunant and, of course, Donna Tartt). The one aesthetic constant has been atmosphere. By that I mean the elusive, because indefinable, quality of a piece of writing that provides an anchor for memory, a point of reference that is non-discursive and unmediated in its mnemonic force, like a scent or a landscape. My favorite writings are those that conjure an inescapable atmposphere, the way a person will produce, if you will, an aura. When the mere mention of a title is sufficient to transport my imagination back to vivid, pervasive scenery and voices, attitudes ... then it can be said that the writer has succeeded in creating a multifloriate atmosphere that may or may not be comparable to my life. It need not be, for a work of art is, of course, a world in itself. And whether the atmosphere is that of early nineteenth-century Liverpool, twenty-first century Manhattan, or Middle Earth in the Third Age, it matters not -- the resultant sense of the place as existing beyond myself, there to be discovered, is the artistic success that raises writing to the level of literature, art.

The most realized atmosphere in The Goldfinch is, oddly enough, the alcohol and drug-addled period spent by the narrator and lead character, Theo Decker, in the Nevada desert, with his unlikely and, as it turns out, fateful friend, Boris. The rather plodding introspection of the preceding section gives way to an almost frenetic, fragmentary manner of recounting a hazy, dreamlike episode -- or series of episodes -- which, as we find out much later, was largely an alcoholic blackout (the chapter sections grow correspondingly shorter here, mimetic of the fragmentary consciousness of the professional abuser of substances). If the startling contrast between the cement canyons of Manhattan and the agoraphobic expanse of the sun-baked Nevada desert is not sufficient to disorient both narrator and reader, the mind-warping intake of alcohol and drugs does the trick. Any description of the desert that did not involve some level of perceptual and noetic distortion would read as woodenly naturalistic. In this section there is almost a metonymic correspondence between Theo's roiling consciousness and the hazy reality of the environment in which he has landed. Tartt's prose in this section effortlessly maintains this sensation at a fever pitch.

It is only as we reach the end of the book that we call into question -- not perhaps for the first time but certainly with greatest force -- the narrator's reliability. The only real constant in the 'story' is Theo's post-traumatic stress disorder, the result of losing his mother in a terrorist bombing of the Metropolitan Museum of Art (during the immediate aftermath of which he filches, for a noble purpose, the eponymous 1654 painting by Fabritius). To say that this painting is some sort of symbolic or emotional anchor is not quite correct, as we discover that Theo has idealized the work in a very personal -- and idolatrous -- manner -- so much so that he is unaware, for a very long time, that the package that he thinks contains the painting actually holds an old civics textbook, switched by his rather amoral friend Boris, who cannot help but covet and steal, even from his only true friend. The switcheroo by Boris takes place during the Nevada episode, which is appropriate. This episode is one of many mini genre-pieces, so to speak, in Tartt's lengthy but remarkably coherent text. I would not hesitate to label the Nevada episode a bildungsroman, for we sense (since we are not explicitly shown) Theo coming of age, or entering into self-awareness, if you prefer. There is striking verisimilitude in this section, for Theo is very selective in his focus -- as we all are, to a greater or lesser extent -- pushing or drinking away anything or anyone that does not aid him in his personal quest for stability, if not contentment or, imagine, happiness. For example, an underlying homoerotic element in his friendship with Boris is subtly suggested in this section, and later verified nonchalantly by Boris. Theo, apparently, was so blacked out he didn't recall his brief foray to the other side, just as he was too tanked to notice that his beloved painting had been switched by his best friend.

It would be simplistic to say that events happen to Theo and he responds. While this is the surface of the narrative at this point, there is a depth. Theo's remarkable adaptability, when wrenched from familiar surroundings and placed in an alien environment with his father -- a wreckless gambler and addict who had abandoned his mother and him, only to return after the former's death for selfish reasons -- and the father's drug-dealing girlfriend, cannot be said to be due to his immersion in alcohol and drugs, although this likely helps. Rather, Theo is seen doing what strong persons who experience tragedy often accomplish: drawing upon that experience for protection against the continually hostile forces of life, and for the power to endure. In less capable hands this would be trite, if not maudlin. Not so here. We do not witness Theo merely rising above the pain of losing his mother; rather, we see him delving deep into his anger and disgust at the mindlessness of existence (and existents), and transforming those dark emotions into a sort of intellectual and emotional fuel. As Theo's introspective habit develops, he becomes acutely aware of his pendulum-like emotional life, swaying from ecstatic love for Pippa (the girl he first saw in the museum the day of the bombing) and a depression so deep he cannot find a single word for it. This "black curtain of horror" is more than just a symptom of opiate withdrawal. He reflects:

But depression wasn't the word. This was a plunge encompassing sorrow and revulsion far beyond the personal: a sick, drenching nausea at all humanity and human endeavor from the dawn of time. The writhing loathsomeness of the biological order. Old age, sickness, death. No escape for anyone. Even the beautiful ones were like soft fruit about to spoil. And yet somehow people still kept fucking and breeding and popping out new fodder for the grave, producing more and more new beings to suffer like this was some kind of redemptive, or good, or even somehow morally admirable thing: dragging more innocent creatures into the lose-lose game. Squirming babies and plodding, complacent, hormone-drugged moms. Oh, isn't he cute? Awww. Kids shouting and skidding in the playground with no idea what future Hell awaited them ... (p. 476)

If The Goldfinch is a dialectical work, in the Hegelian sense, the above quote would represent the antithesis, as Theo passes from love of a person (his mother -- the thesis) to a harsh despising of most -- not all! -- of humanity (antithesis), to a final, fully self-conscious love of beauty as an ideal or, more precisely, love of the beauty that exceeds the person and makes him feel a deep yearning to participate in that beauty -- in other words, love of the sublime (synthesis).

And just as music is the space between notes, just as the stars are beautiful because of the space between them, just as the sun strikes raindrops at a certain angle and throws a prism of color across the sky -- so the space where I exist, and want to keep existing, and to be quite frank I hope I die in, is exactly this middle distance: where despair struck pure otherness and created something sublime. (pp. 770-771)

Indeed, when I finished reading this work, a passage from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit came to my mind. To paraphrase: The life of the Spirit is not the life that shrinks from feebleness and decay but, in utter dissolution, finds itself. This could easily have served as an epigraph for the entire work.

There are various novelistic techniques for building suspense. Every third-rate hack writer knows how to do this. Just read James Patterson, if you have the stomach. Tartt manages to evoke an oppressive sense of impending danger, if not doom, not by any analyzable technique, but 'simply' by telling the tale. "A story is, finally, what it tells and no more," wrote Gore Vidal in an essay on Calvino. It is the sense of the inevitable, on all levels, that makes a story convincing, that produces tension and suspense without recourse to any writer's workshop stylistics. The result is a propulsive force that, yes, keeps the reader turning pages. And, in The Goldfinch, this atmosperic charge is not to be found in any external events, but rather within the consciousness or subconsciousness of Theo himself, as rendered through Tartt's versatile, poetic prose. The subtly threatening visit from his father's loan shark produces tension in the manner of a typical thriller or crime drama, but one never gets the sense that Theo is in any physical danger. The real danger is yet another upheaval of persons and place; at this point, we are not sure if Theo's fragile eggshell mind can handle another displacement. After the death of his father, in a not very suspicious automobile accident, given the dad's constant use of pills washed down with booze, we know that Theo will soon be leaving Nevada, and Boris. Yet we are told that he will be meeting Boris again (over 150 pages later) ... and are left to imagine under what (likely unsavory) circumstances.

It is impossible to synopsize this book, in whole or in part. Suffice to say that Tartt wields her prose with such virtuosity that one gets the sense that one is not reading writing so much as experiencing ever-shifting mental states that sometimes correspond with, sometimes jar against, the environments and atmospheres in which Theo finds himself. Take, for example, the second paragraph of Chapter 6, still in Nevada:

Winter or summer, the days were dazzling; the desert air burned our nostrils and scraped our throats dry. Everything was funny; everything made us laugh. Sometimes, just before sundown, just as the blue of the sky began darkening to violet, we had these wild, electric-lined, Maxfield Parrish clouds rolling out gold and white into the desert like Divine Revelation leading the Mormons west.

In two substantial sentences the visceral response to the desert is recorded, as well as the less tangible interplay of mind and place that is so much like poetry. I thought of Ginsberg when I read these lines, and perhaps Tartt did too, for she reigns herself in (rightly so) and returns us to the reality of Theo's (and Boris's) situation rather quickly. "Our diet had made us malnourished, with soft brown bruises on our arms and legs -- vitamin deficiency, said the nurse at school, who gave us each a painful shot in the ass and a colorful jar of children's chewables." This would be humorous, if we were not aware that both of these young men's fathers are highly unstable. There is the very real danger of Boris's father beating him to death in a drunken rage. While Theo's father is not physically abusive -- except for one uncharacteristic outburst -- the danger of repercussions from his (the father's) unpaid gambling debts hover over everything Theo does. The physical decay is not symbolic of a deeper emotional decay; it is very real. Theo and his buddy eat junk food, drink vodka like water, and live a see-saw life of artifical highs and all-too-natural lows. While their friendhip is genuine, it is of a self-destructive nature typical of substance abusers: big plans for a glorious future while high, followed by vomit-drenched, blinding reality after the come-down. I let out a temporary sigh of relief when Theo finally boarded the Greyhound for New York. Of course, as those of us who have battled addiction know all-too-well, one can change location as often as one likes or is able, but the demon always follows ...

If there is a moral anchor in this tale (for want of a better term) it is Hobie, restorer of fine furniture and friend (more like grandfather-figure) of Theo's beloved Pippa. The conversations between Theo and Hobie are sometimes deeply philosophical, dealing with the morality of beauty and the purpose of maintaining beautiful things, whether furniture or other artworks, or meaningful relationships. Again, nothing cloyingly sentimental, just realistic dialogue between two introspective, highly sensitive persons. Here is Hobie:

Caring too much for objects can destroy you. Only -- if you care for a thing enough, it takes on a life of its own, doesn't it? And isn't the whole point of things -- beautiful things -- that they connect you to some larger beauty? Those first images that crack your heart wide open and you spend the rest of your life chasing, or trying to recapture, in one way or another? (p. 757)

One can easily replace "objects" and "things" and impersonal pronouns, here, with "persons," etc., and get at the 'truth-saying' of this, and similar passages. I daresay that most people who read literature have had the experience of an elusive beauty that they are trying, with every new experience, to recapture. Attachment to art of any kind is often a surrogate for a human attachment that once was, but is no more. If every writer writes for a particular person -- or with the hope that a lost beloved will someday read his words -- many readers, I think, read for insight into their own partially-formulated desires to regain a lost emotional Elysium. That this Elysium all-too-often involves one irreplaceable person is one of the great -- if not the greatest -- tragedies of life. To spend a lifetime seeking an absent presence is to forego other meaningful relationships, and to only partially see, or even to ignore, other manifestations of beauty. To make the transition from the love of a single person to the love of persons, and finally to the love of beauty as a universal, an ideal, is to gain a sort of redemption -- a redemption from the self-centeredness of the personal quest, as concern is transferred from the 'I' and its attendant 'other' to the ethical and moral grounding of the 'We'.

I will not attempt to discuss the symbolism of the Fabritius painting, as it is inscribed in ever-shifting ways throughout the tale until the synthesis, if you accept my Hegelian schema. For one of the great pleasures of this book is flipping to the frontispiece to contemplate the painting as one encounters it in various contexts throughout the tale. Suffice to say that meaning is bestowed, not produced. This goes for meaning found in works of art, as well as in human relationships. If I choose to call a certain failed relationship a mistake ... well, then it is just that. The meaning I derive, then, will be that of a lesson or -- worst-case scenario -- a sickening waste of time, which is no meaning at all. If I choose to consider my failed relationship as a temporary sojourn in a transcendent realm where, for a brief time, I experienced the love that surpasses all understanding, I will have the melancholy comfort of knowing there is a space beyond the self, the 'I' -- a space that is perhaps obtainable again, by way of some heretofore inconceivable person, place, or thing.

[I]t is a glory and a privilege to love what Death doesn't touch. For if disaster and oblivion have followed this painting down through time -- so too has love. Insofar as it is immortal (and it is) I have a small, bright, immutable part in that immortality. It exists; and it keeps on existing. And I add my own love to the history of people who have loved beautiful things, and looked out for them, and pulled them from the fire, and sought them when they were lost, and tried to preserve them and save them while passing them along literally from hand to hand, singing out brilliantly from the wreck of time to the next generation of lovers, and the next. (p. 771, finis)

It would be pedantic of me to remind the reader that it is not only the painting that Theo is reflecting upon here, but I'll do it anyway. He is reflecting upon every person for whom we bear memories of deep love, and maintain those memories for the sake of giving immortality to our ephemeral moments of transcendence. We bestow meaning upon a person's memory in the same manner we bestow meaning upon a work of art: by preserving its immediacy, the initial shock that pulled us -- if only for a moment -- out of our cocoon of self-referentiality.

Now to the question of the novel. Why did I not label The Goldfinch a novel? Every label is shorthand for a definition. And, as every philosopher knows, any definition that is not rigorous and precise is no definition at all. Since we live in a post-Platonic era, in which categories of understanding have given ways to searchable categories of convenience, I feel that hanging a label on this work would be, at best, an unhelpful reduction -- at worst, a silencing or imprisonment of the polyphonic logoi that raise their voices in a single consciousness throughout this text. Of course, it is inevitable that The Goldfinch will go down in literary history as an example of a particularly unconventional novel, such is the academic desire to codify and catalogue for the sake of curriculum (alliteration intentional). This is not without some justification, I will add, for Tartt, while avoiding the sort of meta-commentary on writing that one finds in Michael Gruber's work, for example, does include at the book's end a brief note in which Theo explains how he has not written these pages from memory, but rather from a series of letters to his mother that he began writing at the age of thirteen, and continued throughout his life. He admits that the text we are reading was compiled from these voluminous letters "with the idea that Pippa will see it someday -- which of course she won't" (p. 763). One gets the sense that Theo has intended this work for a posthumous posterity (a pleonasm, but you get my point, I'm sure), not for the eyes of anyone who has participated, wittingly or not, in his life. This is not a mechanical device to add verisimilitude; rather, it lends an extra layer of pathos to an already saturated chronicle of heart and mind. This is not a negative criticism. In an age of dialogue-soaked novels that read like movie scripts, with wooden characters and meager boilerplated prose, reading Donna Tartt's prose is like hearing Joshua Bell perform the Sibelius violin concerto after having suffered Dantesque torment at a Taylor Swift concert.

Of the modern novel, Nathalie Sarraute once wrote that it must "dispossess the reader and entice him, at all costs, into the author's territory. To achieve this the device that consists in referring to the leading characters as 'I' constitutes a means." Anyone who has attempted to write a novel knows how difficult it is to maintain a consistent focus, and sustained interest for the reader, when writing in the third person. And most readers, I daresay, prefer the intimacy of a first person account to the often journalistic third person narration. Obviously, the third person method permits the omniscient narrator to take control and lead us to places a single consciousness could not possibly go. This works especially well in the genres of horror or crime drama / thrillers where true suspense cannot be achieved if the character in danger is the one doing the telling. He or she obviously escaped if he or she is alive to tell the tale. But when the concern is not with mere physical survival, but with intellectual and emotional survival, if not endurance or triumph, then the first person is not only preferable, but necessary. In matters of the heart and mind, I want to hear it from the horse's mouth. It is impossible to imagine The Goldfinch as a third person narrative. It is equally impossible to imagine it as a movie (and I hope Donna Tartt refuses to sell the rights when and if the offer comes). So while this work resembles, superficially, many a modern novel, it is not for the reason (or perhaps purpose) that Sarraute had in mind when she wrote that the cinema "garners and perfects what is left of it by the novel." It is perhaps a tired cliché to state that all great, and some good, novels, old and modern, are successful because they contain a memorable character. But it is useful to remember that characters are memorable because they communicate some truth about life, or the human condition; and that this is accomplished by representation through language that is itself a representation of actions and states. Words are not signs of signs, operating in an ever-expanding network of inter-referentiality, inter-textuality. Words are signifiers referring to very real conditions in the life-world. A text -- a writer! -- is only successful to the extent that this truth (yes, truth!) is kept firmly in mind. Communication is an art. It cannot be accomplished by the clashing voices of a committee, a political party, a group of university creative writing students, or professors at a cocktail party. Only the individual, the person, can communicate truths that ring down the halls of the ages.

I am not aware of the manner in which Donna Tartt composed her work, except that it took several years to complete. I have the image of her sitting alone, in quiet contemplation, like a Romantic poet of old, seeking just the right word, the right image, to make the communication successful. Of course, it is possible that she 'workshopped' some of the chapters, or that she painstakingly reviewed current trends in literature, revising and re-revising in an effort to be unique. I do not want to know. The Romantic image is much more ... human. Either way, The Goldfinch is a success in a way a movie simply cannot be. Technology is no substitute for the creation of worlds with words. Great acting is no substitute for the demiurgic relationship of reader with writer. Dialogue is saying; prose, properly achieved, is showing, telling, effecting. An unforgettable atmosphere is one that has been produced in the same manner as meaning: through the unique, unrepeatable, creative response of the 'I' to the unique, unrepeatable creation of / by the 'other'. 'We' leave the cocoon of self-referentiality and enter the world of art. In this we are, indeed, far beyond the -- merely -- personal.